

Bindery

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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

Our quest for peace took us last week to Manila. There, eight nations met to create unity for security and peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific.

This unity was something that the United States had long sought. Four years ago I negotiated security treaties with Australia and New Zealand and with the Philippines. But we all knew that that was not enough; so these treaties called for "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area." President Eisenhower, in his peace address of April 16, 1953, called for "united action" to meet the threat of aggression in Southeast Asia. Last March, I repeated that appeal.

The President and I had hoped that unity could be forged in time to strengthen the negotiating position of the free nations during the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference. However, this proved impracticable.

The Geneva outcome did, however, confirm the need for unity. So last week, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States met together. We negotiated as full and equal partners and in the end signed a treaty for defense against both open armed attack and against internal subversion.²

The treaty provides that, in the case of aggression by armed attack, each of the countries will act to meet the common danger. A council is

¹ Delivered to the Nation over radio and television on Sept. 15 (press release 509).

² For texts of the Secretary's statements at the Conference and of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 391.

established for consultation with regard to military and other planning.

The treaty recognizes also the danger of subversion and indirect aggression. It deals with this difficult problem more explicitly than any other security treaty that has been made. In this respect, the treaty represents an important forward step, because subversion and indirect aggression have been principal tools of international communism.

The treaty provides that if any party believes that the integrity of the treaty area is menaced by other than armed attack, the parties shall consult immediately to agree on measures which should be taken for the common defense. These measures will, of course, never involve intervention in the purely internal affairs of another state.

The United States was in a special position at Manila, because it was the only one of the signatories which did not have territorial interests in the treaty area. For the others, the pact was not only an anti-Communist pact but also a regional pact. Therefore, it dealt with any and all acts of aggression which might disturb the peace of the area. We stipulated on behalf of the United States, however, that the only armed attack in that area which we would regard as necessarily dangerous to our peace and security would be a Communist armed attack.

Any significant expansion of the Communist world would, indeed, be a danger to the United States, because international communism thinks in terms of ultimately using its power position against the United States. Therefore, we could honestly say, using the words that President Monroe used in proclaiming his Doctrine, that Communist armed aggression in Southeast Asia

would, in fact, endanger our peace and security and call for counteraction on our part.

Promoting Economic Welfare

The treaty recognizes the importance of economic welfare. But it does not commit the United States to any "handout" program. We agree to cooperate in the development of economic measures which will promote economic and social well-being. Congress this year had the vision to see that there might be special needs in Southeast Asia. So, by the Mutual Security Act, Congress has already provided a fund to be available in this area. Part of it will no doubt be spent to assist the free governments of Southeast Asia.

However, the treaty builds no economic walls. From an economic standpoint, such nations as Japan, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and India remain important.

The treaty area is defined as the territory of the member states in Southeast Asia and the Southwestern Pacific. The protocol also extends the treaty benefits to Cambodia and Laos and the free territory of Viet-Nam. The Indochina armistice created obstacles to these three countries becoming actual parties to the treaty at the present time. The treaty will, however, to the extent that is practicable, throw a mantle of protection over these young nations.

This Manila Pact represents a considerable accomplishment. I would have been glad if it had come earlier. But it is definitely better now than never.

Of course, treaties are not self-operative. The signature of a treaty does not of itself have any miraculous effect. There have to be ratifications, and then there has to be a genuine will to carry out the treaty purposes.

I believe that the Manila Pact will, in fact, make a substantial contribution to preserve free governments in Southeast Asia and to prevent communism from rushing on into the Pacific area, where it would seriously threaten the defense of the United States.

We considered at Manila how to implement the treaty. One possibility was to create a joint military force. However, I explained that the United States' responsibilities were so vast and so far-flung that we believed that we would serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of

mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves.

This viewpoint was accepted. Thus, the treaty will not require us to make material changes in our military plans. These plans already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many as effectively as it protects one.

In addition to agreeing to and signing the Manila Pact, there was also drawn up and signed a declaration known as the Pacific Charter. This proclaimed certain basic principles in relation to the right of peoples to self-determination, self-government, and independence.

This Pacific Charter was the idea of President Magsaysay of the Philippine Republic. He is a distinguished fighter for freedom against communism, and he felt it very important that our Manila Conference should make clear that we were seeking the welfare of the Asian peoples and we were not promoting "colonialism."

Principles of Pacific Charter

In my opening address to the Conference, I emphasized that one of the most effective weapons of communism was to pretend that the Western Powers were seeking to impose colonialism on the Asian peoples. I said we must make it abundantly clear that we intend to invigorate independence. "Only then can the West and the East work together in true fellowship."

This Manila Conference faced up to that issue. It was the first conference where representative nations of Asia and of the West sat down together to work out a program of mutual security. The result was the Pacific Charter, which, in ringing terms, dedicates all the signatories to uphold the principles of self-determination, self-government, and independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Whenever there arises in Asia a power that wants to conquer others, it adopts the motto: "Asia for the Asians." The Japanese, when they were dominated by the war lords, used that slogan. Today the Soviet and Chinese Communists have adopted it. They want to prevent the free coun-

tries of Asia from getting the help they need to preserve their independence.

The Pacific Charter, on which the East and the West did meet, may well prove to be the most momentous product of the Conference.

The Communists' attitude was shown, during the Conference, by vicious propaganda attacks and even more significantly by new military activity in a nearby area. Apparently they hoped to intimidate the members of our Conference and perhaps prevent some from signing the security pact.

Efforts to intimidate by violence are typical of the Communist technique. When the Korean armistice negotiations were reaching their climax, the Chinese Communists opened their bloodiest assault against the United Nations position in Korea. Once it had been agreed to discuss peace in Indochina, the Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh, backed by Communist China, opened their murderous assault on Dien-Bien-Phu. And as the Manila Conference opened, the Chinese Communists opened their artillery fire on Quemoy, an island which has been part of Free China ever since the end of World War II and which was only about 400 miles distant from the Philippines.

This effort to intimidate the Manila Conference was a total failure. All of the participants signed the Manila Pact and the Pacific Charter with confidence that in so doing they were adding to their own security.

Now, the Soviet Foreign Office has just issued a lengthy statement denouncing the Manila Pact. It particularly complains of article 4, which provides for united resistance to armed attack and political subversion. The Soviet statement says that the Chinese Communists also do not like the pact.

The Manila Pact is directed against no government, against no nation, and against no people. It is directed only against aggression. The fact that the Communists find that objectionable is tragically revealing of their ambitions.

The United States at Manila impressively showed national unity. The three plenipotentiary delegates to the Conference were H. Alexander Smith, Republican Senator from New Jersey; Michael J. Mansfield, Democratic Senator from Montana; and I. Both Senators are members of the Foreign Relations Committee and are thoroughly familiar with Far Eastern matters.

Thus the Executive and the Senate and both political parties took part in the negotiation and the consummation of the treaty. I am greatly indebted to the contribution which both Senators made to the successful outcome of the Conference.

The theme of our Conference was "greater security through greater unity." We need that unity not only as among nations but also within our own Nation. It is healthy to have two political parties which compete for the right to represent the Nation. It is also important that that competition should stop at the water's edge so that, when we face others, we do so as a united nation. That has been our developing tradition, and the Manila Conference added to that tradition a new and a worthy chapter.

Security Council Meeting on Problems of Pacific

Statement by the President

White House Office press release dated September 13

Yesterday, the National Security Council met with me here in Denver. This was unprecedented, but it was also very natural. I had not met with the Council for more than 2 weeks, while it happened that yesterday Secretary Dulles reached here on his way back from the Philippines, where he had been conducting difficult negotiations.

We met in order that all of us together could have the benefit of his observations and the details of his report.

No specific decisions were advanced for action. It was merely a consulting together as to the place of the United States in the world today in that particular area—that troubled area of the Western Pacific—and reaffirming our devotion to certain policies.

These are, of course, to defend the vital interests of the United States wherever they may arise, to make better partners of old friends, and to get new friends wherever we can. And of course, where our vital interests demand it, to support them in their security and in their own interests.

The meeting lasted several hours and broke up last evening.

Consultations With West German and British Leaders

Following are the texts of statements made by Secretary Dulles at Washington on September 15 as he left for visits to Bonn and London, at Bonn on September 16, and at Watertown, N. Y., on September 18, together with communiques issued at Bonn and at London on September 17.

STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 15

Press release 510

I am leaving for Europe on account of the problem created by the French failure to ratify the treaties which would have restored German sovereignty and brought Germany into a European Defense Community.

The United States Senate, before it recessed last month, unanimously resolved that in this eventuality steps should be taken to restore German sovereignty and to enable her to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ I accordingly plan to be in Bonn Thursday afternoon [September 16] to initiate discussion of this matter with Chancellor Adenauer. I shall spend Friday in London where I shall confer with the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden.

Because the United Nations General Assembly convenes the first of next week, I shall not have the opportunity to meet others in Europe at this time. However, it is probable that later this month there will be a European meeting at which the representatives of a number of interested countries will be present, and I look forward to having, at that time, a further and broader exchange of views.

STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16

I have come to discuss with Chancellor Adenauer the means of restoring sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and bringing Germany as an equal partner into the society of the free. Such action has been suspended while various parliaments dealt with the treaties which contemplated that German sovereignty should be returned within the framework of a European Defense Community.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 284.

Since that program has been halted, at least temporarily, an alternative must be found.

The postwar Federal Republic has consistently followed such enlightened policies that its views must now command great respect. Therefore, I come to Bonn for an exchange of views with the Chancellor.

Before final decisions are reached, there will, of course, be further exchanges of views between all who are genuinely concerned with the peace, security, and freedom of Europe.

BONN COMMUNIQUE OF SEPTEMBER 17

The American Secretary of State and the German Federal Chancellor held a thorough discussion of the European situation on September 16 and 17 in Bonn. The conversation took place in the friendly and cordial atmosphere which has characterized the relations of the two governments. There was complete agreement that European integration was so vital to peace and security that efforts to achieve it should be resolutely pursued and that this great goal should not be abandoned because of a single setback.

They agreed that German sovereignty should be restored with all speed. At the same time they agreed that Germany should participate in full equality in a system of collective security. This program, so important for the fate of Germany and the free world, should, in view of the two ministers, be further considered as soon as practicable with the other interested governments and following a NATO ministerial meeting should be translated into concrete action.

LONDON COMMUNIQUE OF SEPTEMBER 17

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden exchanged views in London on September 17, in the light of their recent journeys, on the situation caused by the French Assembly's rejection of the European Defense Community.

They agreed upon the need for speedy action and favored the early convening of a preparatory conference to consider how best to associate the German Federal Republic with Western nations on a basis of full equality.

STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 18

Press release 515

I return from a 2-day trip to Europe. I conferred in Germany with Chancellor Adenauer and at London with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden.

When the French Parliament failed to ratify the treaties to create the European Defense Community and to restore sovereignty to Germany, I felt that my duty was to meet promptly with Chancellor Adenauer. He has sought wholeheartedly to associate Germany with the free West. He has wanted Germany to contribute to the security of the free West. But he has been zealous to find ways whereby German rearmament would be so integrated into a single European force that it could never again serve German militarism.

I found the Chancellor holding steadfast to the lofty concept of European unity. However, he feels that it is no longer possible to withhold sovereignty from Germany until European unity is achieved; also that there can no longer be deferred the preliminary steps which will permit Germany to exercise the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

I informed the Chancellor that his views in these respects were fully shared not only by President Eisenhower but by the Congress and, I believe, by the American people generally. I pointed out that the United States Senate, by a resolution adopted with unanimity, had urged the restoration of German sovereignty so as to enable Germany to contribute to international peace and security.

At Bonn we talked over all these matters. I feel confident that we can continue to count upon the Federal Republic of Germany to pursue policies of wisdom and moderation and not to close the door to the eventual realizing of the great vision of a united Europe.

At London I learned from Mr. Eden of the results of his recent trip to Brussels, Bonn, Rome, and Paris. I also informed him as to the views of the United States and the impressions which I had gained from my own visit to Bonn.

It is apparent, indeed it has long been apparent, that there is no adequate substitute for the European Defense Community. Nevertheless we must do the best that we can. Many minds are resourcefully studying what next steps are in order. We hope that sufficient preparatory work can be done during the coming week to justify a preliminary meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the countries principally concerned during the week following that.

It would be a mistake to assume that any acceptable solution has been fully developed. It would be an even greater mistake to adopt a negative approach which would result in the disintegration of what has been built since the war out of the sacrifices, the efforts, the aspirations of many.

The United States is deeply concerned with the maintenance of peace and security on the European continent. European security is intimately connected with our own. We shall, therefore, continue our association with European planning to achieve those ends. There are many European leaders who retain hope of real achievement. They know that we will support them in their creative efforts.

Department Names Political Advisers to General Assembly Delegation

The Department of State announced on September 17 (press release 513) the designation of four principal political advisers to the U.S. delegation to the Ninth General Assembly of the United Nations, which convened at New York on September 21. They are: John C. Dreier, U.S. representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, who will act as adviser on American Republic affairs; Jack K. McFall, Ambassador to Finland, who will act as adviser on European affairs; Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, who will be adviser on Far Eastern affairs; and Henry S. Villard, Minister to Libya, who will act as adviser on Near Eastern and African affairs.

The Reorganization of the American Foreign Service

by Charles E. Saltzman
Under Secretary for Administration¹

Before coming over here, I happened to scan a copy of the annual report of the Advertising Council, whose efforts in the public service each year are a powerful demonstration of the progressive attitude and social conscience of American business. The inside of the front cover carried a quotation that struck me not only as appropriate to this occasion but so profoundly true and so applicable to our present situation that I am moved to repeat it.

"No business is an island—every business is a citizen of its community and of the nation."

Your presence here is concrete evidence—if any is needed—that business recognizes its responsibilities and proceeds on the thesis that the public good cannot be separated from its own.

One cannot spend much time in Washington without being impressed by the willingness of business leaders to sacrifice their personal interests in the service of government. You don't have to look very hard to discover that the top businessmen spend a great deal of time contributing such service as membership on boards and commissions. I could cite many such instances, but I have one in mind, in particular—the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel.

That Committee is a good example of the readiness of business executives to contribute their talents to the problems of government. And I cite this Committee also because its mission—the reorganization and strengthening of the American Foreign Service—is really the subject of my talk this noon.

¹ Address made before the Board of Directors of National Sales Executives, Inc., at Washington, D. C., on Sept. 10.

I want to talk for a while about the work of this Public Committee and of the program under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry M. Wriston, president of Brown University, who gave wise and experienced leadership to the group.² I do so because I believe it will be of interest to businessmen like yourselves who have a keen appreciation of the State Department's responsibilities in the cold war. To discuss this Committee, its work, and the way it handled its assignment presents certain difficulties because I was a member of it. I ask you to be tolerant if I make it evident that I think the Committee did a good job. I am convinced of the importance of the Committee's assigned mission and am proud to have been identified with such a public-spirited and effective group of men.

Expansion of Government Activity

The Committee's mission concerned one phase of a larger problem about which we have all heard a good deal in the past decade—the problem of attracting top men to government service. Even in our generation the activities of government have immensely expanded and its responsibilities tremendously increased. You and I have witnessed a major change in the world position of the United States. Thirty years ago American foreign policy was conditioned by the existence of the great ocean barriers on each coast con-

² For the list of the members of the Committee, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 413. For the recommendations of the Committee, see *Toward a Stronger Foreign Service: Report of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, June 1954*, Department of State publication 5458, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., 30¢.

trolled by the combined seapower of this country and Great Britain. A small group of aviation enthusiasts were trying to extend the range of military aircraft beyond the 500-mile mark and striving to intensify the interest of professional military strategists in the striking potential of bombers. And to the rank and file of Americans, foreign policy was a matter of a secondary interest. In fact, this was largely true up until World War II.


I think there is no need to belabor the contrast between then and now. The major significance is that in the present era government policy, domestic and foreign alike—and at times it is difficult to distinguish between the two—exerts a great influence on all of our daily lives. In fact, our survival as a people and as a nation may depend upon it.

The impact of this development on the State Department was sharp. Its responsibility for the

conduct of postwar foreign relations took on gigantic proportions. Not only had old problems been intensified by the war, but fundamental new difficulties now appeared and had to be faced. The U.N. had been established. This country found itself projected into an unexpected global struggle with the modern imperialism of communism led by Soviet Russia. We were in a cold rather than a shooting war. A cold war is principally a State Department war. With our way of life itself at stake, it is clear that those problems in the province of the Department of State were of the utmost gravity to us as a nation.

It is ironic that the American public knows less about the functions and the responsibilities of the State Department than of any other branch of the Federal Government. The irony here is sharpened by the fact that the major difficulties faced by the United States today are within the area of State Department responsibility. Our present-day do-

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS 20,250 EMPLOYEES



mestic problems cannot compare in gravity with those which come from abroad.

The tasks at which the State Department labors are difficult—and it may well be that some of them are impossible of accomplishment. And because the public knows little about the State Department, I don't think we can expect much popular understanding and sympathy unless the public knows more about us than it has in the past. It should be borne in mind that the State Department is identified with one major trouble after another. I might add that the foregoing is an occupational hazard accepted as routine by the Department's employees.

In these terms, then, it is abundantly obvious that a government—or one of its branches—which must cope daily with matters of great intricacy and of transcendent importance to the people should be able to draw on the best American minds. And it is equally obvious that our national interest demands that the government be


effectively administered and staffed by competent and experienced people. This is particularly true of the Department of State in view of its central role in the cold war. A large portion of the State Department's responsibility falls on our professional diplomatic corps, the American Foreign Service.

This situation did not go unrecognized. Several steps were taken to strengthen the Foreign Service which, for a variety of reasons which I will touch on later, produced few results. When Secretary Dulles took office, the problem had reached an acute stage, as had many other aspects of our international relations. As soon as was feasible, the Committee on Personnel was appointed to examine the problem and make recommendations.

{ Let me give you an idea of what this Committee found on looking into the Foreign Service organization. They discovered it was one of two separate and distinct personnel systems inside the

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL CATEGORIES UNDER VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

Approximations Based on Present Strength of 11,100 Americans



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THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PUBLIC COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

TERMS OF REFERENCE

THE PROBLEM

"...a more effective instrument for the conduct of United States foreign relations and thereby a greater protection to the national security."

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE

"...that the Department and its establishment abroad may be staffed to the maximum possible extent by career personnel, specially trained for the conduct of foreign relations and obligated to serve at home and abroad."

March 5, 1954

Department of State. The other was the Civil Service system. And under the Foreign Service system were three subsystems with differing pay scales, retirement systems, and employment regulations.

They found that the 1,285 Foreign Service officers represented only about one-third the number needed for staffing of overseas posts and manning the geographic and political desks in the Department. On this group fell the main burden of representing the United States in the 105 countries with whom we maintain relations. And as some of you know, this is no light assignment.

The responsibilities of the Foreign Service are varied. Its officers conduct the business of American embassies and legations. They perform consular services for American citizens abroad. They handle certain phases of the increasing business that this country has with other nations, and the negotiation of treaties and agreements. In addition, the Foreign Service officer does vital reporting for this Government abroad. He is the eyes and ears of the United States overseas—the source of the political and economic intelligence upon which many policy decisions are based.


The foregoing is by no means a complete résumé

of the career diplomat's duties. But I think it is enough to suggest that he performs a vital service—and that demands perception, judgment, intelligence. And well does he need them, for he is charged with the most crucial problems which affect the very existence of your family and mine.

If we are short of trained men, if our Foreign Service lacks a good supply of these qualities in its delicate and vital mission, our ability to form and execute policy in a grave emergency would be crippled.

You need no convincing, I am sure, that the emergency is painfully real. I have already noted the threat of Communist imperialism which is being pressed by the Kremlin on all fronts—military, political, economic, and psychological. Add to this a few present-day examples of foreign-relations problems. The refusal of the French Chamber of Deputies to ratify the European Defense Community, which was an important component of American policy in Europe, has compelled a complete review of that policy with perhaps the effective defense of Western Europe hanging in the balance. Dangerous unrest continues to plague North Africa, where we have located important air bases for Western defense.

TRANSFER TO FOREIGN SERVICE STATUS



The settlement of the Suez dispute and the Iranian oil question offers a good chance to move ahead toward the establishment of solid free-world defense in the Middle East if we plan with sufficient skill. The people of Guatemala have removed a Communist beachhead in this hemisphere, and we are now working with the other American nations to tighten the hemispheric defenses against Communist penetration. In the Far East we have just joined in a security pact with seven other powers who have a stake in peace and security in Southeast Asia.

In this complicated situation we have been operating with a professional diplomatic corps in which one-third of the foreign affairs officers have been separated from the rest by unnecessary administrative partitions. And furthermore, we have been operating with a service in which the morale of the individual officer has been impaired.

But before taking up this matter of morale, I have several points that should be mentioned at this time. One is that present efforts to strengthen and expand the Foreign Service and to remedy

certain organic faults are by no means the first efforts in this direction. In the immediate post-war period the Congress took cognizance of the need for a stronger Foreign Service and passed legislation designed to aid in building it up. A task force of the first Hoover Commission on government reorganization in 1949 took strong note of the deficiencies I mentioned and offered recommendations to remedy them. There also was a directive issued in 1951 which, if promptly complied with, would have permitted an expansion of the Foreign Service officer corps by lateral entry at various grades from other parts of the State Department and by a speedup in recruitment.

There are probably a number of reasons why the indicated reforms were not instituted. One major reason is certainly the lack of aggressive administration. I have cited the existence of two parallel personnel organizations within the State Department which, in my view, could not help but contribute to administrative malfunction. Moreover, this dual system encouraged the Foreign Service to regard itself as a group apart and

blocked an advantageous interchange of skills and experience between the Foreign Service and the headquarters organization as represented by the Civil Service staff.

In regard to the earlier recommendations, the administrative delays and postponements in putting them into effect were tantamount to nullifying them. In sum, prior proposals to strengthen the Foreign Service were well enough conceived. Had they been put into effect with reasonable vigor, the chances are that the Committee on Personnel would not have been needed. But as is always the case, recommendations mean nothing unless action is taken. And in the case of the Foreign Service, very little was actually done. It is therefore to be hoped that this time things are going to be different. It is my primary purpose in my present job to see that they are.

The Morale Factor

Before going into particulars on my reasons for saying that, I would like to discuss briefly a factor I have mentioned earlier—the factor of morale. You cannot fail to be aware of the various attacks that have been directed against the State Department and its Foreign Service. These attacks range all the way from charges that they are a group of individuals who go around to cocktail parties wearing striped pants to accusations of disloyalty. Unhappily, in the present climate

there isn't a great deal an individual Foreign Service officer can do in the way of an effective defense. A man doesn't make much yardage denying that he wears striped pants. And if he proves the accusations of disloyalty unfounded, the best he can come off with is being a man who proved he wasn't disloyal.

On this count, I have several things to say. First, whatever basis the attacks on the Foreign Service may have had in the past—and I don't think there was much—they cannot be held to be of substance now. Along with everyone else in the executive departments, the State Department, including the Foreign Service corps, has been subjected to a thorough and exhaustive going-over in the area of loyalty and security pursuant to the requirements of President Eisenhower's Executive order on the subject issued last year.

But even so, the attacks have had a demoralizing effect. It was inevitable that the morale of the Service would suffer—a development which was abetted by a reduction in force made necessary by a severe budget cut. You may be assured that the State Department's management realizes fully the importance of good morale and its effect on performance.

Thus, in addition to greater size and strength, there was need for a boost in morale. These were the main—but not the only—weak spots. The training of men for the Foreign Service stressed the development of the all-around man—the "generalist" so to speak—at the expense of the specialist, for which there is now a real need. The Service also had a tradition of promoting everybody from the bottom up through the ranks. Thus, qualified men outside the Service proper, available for appointment at middle or upper levels, have not been drawn in except in comparatively few instances. There are other items which could be mentioned if time permitted.

EXAMINATION PROCEDURE

PRESUMPTIONS

If performance record acceptable

- ‡ Officer is eligible for appointment
- ‡ Present salary and grade level justified

EXAMINATION

Consists of

- ‡ Review of performance record
- ‡ Supervisors' appraisals
- ‡ Interview with senior officer



Committee Recommendations

With the difficulties thus defined, the Committee submitted detailed recommendations to remedy them. These were examined by the top men in the Department and received, as well, the attention of the White House. Secretary Dulles approved all the fundamental recommendations of the Wriston Committee and ordered them put

into effect.³ Personally I am convinced that the program will go far toward assuring that we have the kind of Foreign Service that we need. And I am very sure that it will not encounter the difficulties experienced by previous efforts. In all its various phases it has the vigorous support of Secretary Dulles and has the President's personal interest.

I would like to mention briefly the high points of the program. A major project is the integration into one Foreign Service officer corps of the Foreign Service, and the Civil Service and the so-called Foreign Service staff above a certain level of employment. Upper-level officers working on foreign affairs, now in the Civil Service or Foreign Service staff, if they are willing and qualified, will be drawn into the Foreign Service officer corps by a process we describe as lateral entry.


By this means, we will be able to accomplish a quick expansion of the Foreign Service by taking in experienced officers, particularly needed specialists, from the Departmental staff and the Foreign Service staff. Foreign Service regulations are

being liberalized to facilitate the rotation of officers so that the newly acquired Foreign Service officers can be given overseas experience and members of the present Foreign Service can be assured of more assignments in this country.


This rotation is very important to prevent our diplomatic corps from losing touch with developments here. And it is not hard to lose touch. To a shockingly large extent service in the Foreign Service officers corps has heretofore been the equivalent of exile. For example, of a group of 197 officers with more than 20 years of service, 45 had served on assignment in the United States 2 years or less. We discovered that one officer in 43 years of service had 13 months' assignment here.

At present it is our hope to bring the members of the Foreign Service corps back for a State-side assignment after a 6-year tour overseas. If this schedule can be maintained, we can be sure of a corps whose knowledge and feeling for the American scene is regularly refreshed. In addition, by periodic participation in it in this country, they would have a better and more comprehensive understanding of policymaking and the forces that influence it.

³ BULLETIN of June 28, 1954, p. 1002.



THE SHAPE OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN SERVICE BY ORIGIN AND GRADE STRUCTURE*



*Based on present class structure of FSO Corps and those other officers whose positions would be designated for FSO staffing.

The process of lateral entry is stage one of a two-stage expansion of the Service. By it we will be able to build up the corps' strength quickly at the middle and upper levels.

Recruitment Program

To complement the lateral entry program, we have instituted a more energetic plan of recruitment of young officer candidates—to insure that the Foreign Service will get a steady supply of new blood. We are improving our contacts with colleges and universities—the main sources of candidate material—and have accelerated the examination and selection schedule so that the current delays in appointment will not discourage good prospects.

In addition, we hope to launch a Foreign Service Scholarship Training Program, which will enlist promising candidates at the end of their second year in college and provide them with a scholarship during their last 2 years. These scholarship

students would commit themselves to the guidance of the State Department, exercised through the Foreign Service Institute, for the last half of their college course. Scholarship students would guarantee to serve a minimum of 4 years after being graduated.

Under the foregoing program, we plan to build the Foreign Service to a level just short of 4,000 officers in the space of 2 years.

With such a Foreign Service corps, we will have a group which speaks with one voice. If a person is employed by the Department of State in a Foreign Service capacity, regardless of whether his post is in Rangoon or in Washington, he will be a member of the Foreign Service corps. The cleavage between the Foreign Service officer, committed to extensive duty overseas, under a separate administrative machinery, and the foreign affairs specialist under Civil Service without commitments for overseas service, will be at an end. Frictions will be eliminated, separatism ended.

We will have a Foreign Service expanded to the needed size and greatly enriched.

We look forward to a Foreign Service corps of this kind because it is the answer to a long-felt need. There are many administrative problems to solve, but that is to be expected in any reorganization. The point which I now emphasize is that we have made a good beginning. And now that we are on our way, we are determined to see it through.

Statement by Secretary Dulles on Personnel Integration Program

Department Circular 115 dated September 8

In March I appointed a Public Committee on Personnel to recommend measures necessary to strengthen the professional service of the Department and the Foreign Service. The Committee studied the matter, reviewed the recommendations of prior study groups, interviewed numerous officers of the Department and the Foreign Service, and sought advice in many quarters.

I reviewed the work of the Committee and concluded that the actions they recommended—to expand the Foreign Service officer corps, to simplify the personnel structure, and to create within the State Department in Washington a number of positions to be filled by Foreign Service officers—will be of benefit to the Department and to the conduct of foreign affairs.

The national interest urgently requires a stronger and more versatile Foreign Service. I agree with the Committee that the way to achieve this objective is to bring into the Foreign Service officer corps many of those civil servants now in the Washington headquarters, Foreign Service Reserve officers, and higher-level Foreign Service Staff. The members of the expanded Service will be obligated to serve at home and abroad and will staff not only posts in the field but the majority of officer positions in the Department as well. The augmented Foreign Service will rest on the existing statutory foundation.

The President signed on August 31, 1954, an act passed by the Congress which facilitates our moving ahead with the integration program as recommended by the Public Committee. This act amends the Foreign Service Act of 1946 to permit

lateral appointments to classes FSO-1 through FSO-5 at any of the salary rates of these classes rather than only at the minimum rate of the class. The present amendment permits only 500 appointments at other than the minimum rate, and this authority expires March 31, 1955. Eligibility for such appointments is limited to officers appointed from the classified civil service, the Foreign Service Reserve, or the Foreign Service Staff. Incumbents of schedule A, B, and C positions and other excepted positions (e. g. positions in USUN [the U.S. Mission to the United Nations]), Presidential appointees, and personnel who do not have civil service status are ineligible for such appointments and, therefore, may only be appointed to the minimum rate of the class. The Congress, in passing this limited authority, did so with the intent of permitting us to proceed with the program but also to insure a full review by the Congress early in its next session. I hope that in obtaining an extension of this authority we may also gain the removal of these limitations.

So that each one of you may know the objectives of integration and my intentions as we move through the several phases of the program, this circular constitutes an overall policy statement. This should be read in conjunction with the Committee's Report, which discusses the reasons which led to recommending the integration program.

The integration program involves the following actions:

Designation of Positions

About 1,400 Departmental positions, including 16 in the U.S. delegation to the U.N., have been designated as "Foreign Service positions" and will, in due course, be staffed by Foreign Service officers.

This is in accordance with the policy statement issued on February 6, 1954: ". . . that positions dealing with substantive policy, desk officers and higher in the regional bureaus, and comparable positions in the U.N. area, shall be filled by Foreign Service officers." In addition, many positions in the functional and administrative areas have been designated "Foreign Service positions." The positions not so designated will continue to be staffed under civil service procedures. Steps are also being taken to identify those positions at overseas posts, which the Committee estimated would number approximately 2,250, which will be staffed by Foreign Service officers and, as

requested, by Foreign Service Reserve officers. The positions overseas not so designated will be filled by Foreign Service Staff personnel.

Transfer of Officers

The transfer of Departmental, Reserve, and Staff officers to the Foreign Service officer corps will be effected on a voluntary basis and by invitation under a revised examination process. This process will be based on the presumptions:

- (a) That an officer with an acceptable record is eligible to enter the Foreign Service;
- (b) That his present grade-and-salary level is justified, and he should transfer to the Foreign Service at a substantially equivalent salary level.

The records of present Departmental, Reserve, and Staff officers in "Foreign Service positions" will be reviewed in the light of these presumptions, and this review of the record, supplemented by the evaluations placed on the individual by his supervisors, will be the principal component of the examination process. The oral examination will consist of an interview with a single examiner. This review and examination procedure has already begun.

So far as possible, steps will be taken so that transfers to the Foreign Service officer corps will not prove inequitable to present members of the Foreign Service officer group.

The strengthening of the Foreign Service officer corps through this voluntary transfer will be completed within 2 years.

With exceptions based on individual circumstances, Departmental officers holding "Foreign Service positions" who are unwilling to transfer will be moved to "non-Foreign Service positions" in the Department or assisted to find other employment. The Department will endeavor to minimize the disruption to the careers of such employees. Every effort will be made to complete this phase of the program within 3 years.

Departmental officers not holding positions designated as "Foreign Service positions" may apply for lateral appointment to the expanded Foreign Service officer corps. Their qualifications will be reviewed under the revised lateral entry program.

The Foreign Service officer group, which traditionally has been composed of generalists, will

in the future include specialists to the extent specialists are needed for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The determination of eligibility for transfer to the Foreign Service officer group, and subsequent assignment within the Service, will recognize the need for including and developing specialists. There will be no discrimination against those who are specialists in rank, compensation, or promotion. Since the successful operation of the several areas of the Department depends heavily upon trained specialists, the availability of suitable replacements will, of course, determine the time and extent to which present officers can be assigned to the field after their entry into the FSO corps. Likewise, future plans for rotation of such personnel between Washington and the field will depend upon the size of the pool of experienced specialists upon which the Department can draw.

Amendment to section 571 (a) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 will be sought to authorize the Secretary of State to waive the 4-year limitation on the assignment of Foreign Service personnel to the Department where continuity of longer than 4 years is a requirement of the positions to which assigned or where there are other compelling reasons which make it in the Government's interest for personnel to remain longer than 4 years in the United States.

In making assignments of new lateral entrants to overseas posts, care will be exercised to avoid undue disruption of Departmental operations and undue personal or family hardship to the officer concerned. It is not expected, therefore, that Departmental officers will be assigned to overseas posts immediately upon, or even shortly after, their acceptance of FSO appointments.

Foreign Service Categories

The functions of three present categories of the Foreign Service will be modified as follows:

(1) The Foreign Service officer corps will be expanded to staff substantially all officer positions abroad and all "Foreign Service positions" in the home office. The Committee estimated that there will eventually be approximately 8,900 Foreign Service officers based on current budget resources.

(2) The Foreign Service Reserve will continue

for the purpose of making temporary appointments or appointments of persons not yet eligible for lateral entry to the Foreign Service officer corps.

(3) The Foreign Service Staff will be essentially limited to technical, clerical, and custodial personnel in the lower and middle grades.

Recruitment

Recruitment from civil service registers will be limited to "non-Foreign Service positions" in the Department. With rare exceptions, all other recruitment will be to the Foreign Service.

The successful achievement of the integration program will require the full cooperation of all.

Charter Review—Some Pertinent Questions

by Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

A general conference to review the present U. N. Charter will be convened, probably sometime in 1956, if a simple majority at the tenth session of the General Assembly in 1955 so desires. This possibility is provided for by article 109, paragraph 3, of the charter. Amendments to the charter come into force for all members when approved by two-thirds of them, that is to say 40, but in all cases including ourselves, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The Great Powers have a veto over amendments. The United States Senate must concur in amendments by a two-thirds vote in order for any amendments to come into effect at all.

The United States has taken the initiative in focusing public attention on this impending event. Secretary Dulles has several times spoken publicly of it and has called on private organizations throughout the land to study the issues and give the Government their advice. Many organizations have responded. In the Senate, the so-called Wiley subcommittee on the U. N. Charter has held public hearings in different sections of the country and has already heard testimony in Washington

from Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.²

The advice to be rendered by the Senate and by most nongovernmental organizations will not be in hand until sometime in 1955. The administration has announced that final United States policies will not be crystallized and made public until it has had the benefit of such advice.

This means that official policies which are finally adopted will, to the greatest possible extent, take account of the collective attitudes and thoughts of a significant spectrum of American opinion. Students of this subject may find a provocative model in the process of developing this consensus, because what may be called an American consensus, while it happily reflects the most deeply shared values of our Nation, also happily does not conform to any single mold or pattern when it comes to the practical application of common principles to international problems. How, then, does one usefully and constructively think about this problem, discover an American consensus, and translate it into official policy and diplomatic action?

¹ Address made before the American Political Science Association at Chicago, Ill., on Sept. 10.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1954, p. 170, and Mar. 22, 1954, p. 451.

Only the first part of this question yields even a tentative answer at this stage. That answer is being developed in many ways in many places. You would perhaps be surprised at the extent to which the topic of charter review is currently engrossing the attention of busy and thoughtful Americans. As I mentioned at the outset, it is the subject of inquiry by a special Senate subcommittee with eminent membership. Within the State Department an increasing amount of effort is being devoted to studies bearing on the problem. Abroad, other governments are beginning to organize their own thinking and, thanks largely to the Carnegie Endowment overseas project, so are private organizations.

Many Things to Many Men

That this subject should exercise a peculiar fascination for so many people at so many levels is a measure, I think, of the unique nature of the United Nations. Despite the very real difficulties it has encountered and the frustrations we have sometimes felt in being a part of it, but equally because of these things, the United Nations conveys a variety of special meanings to widely divergent groups of people.

Many practical and worldly questions arise when we evaluate our experience with the U. N., and these belong at the hard core of scholarly thinking on this subject. But demonstrably, a layer of far less tangible matter surrounds the core. I mean the various potent symbols which the U. N., as an institution and as an idea, has the capacity to represent.

Even those whose interest in international relations is wholly peripheral find in the U. N. a symbol of universal human longing for peace and security. Those who have made a cause of international organization often tend to view the U. N. and its charter as symbolic of that cause, constituting a spiritual and political end in itself which personifies man's triumph over such allegedly atavistic concepts as "power politics" and "isolationism."

Those whose chief emotion is impatience with what is, regard it as a symbol of what could and must be. Those who fear and distrust the world around us frequently see it as a symbol of evil, potentially capable of fatally diluting our most profound indigenous values. And no such cata-

log would be complete before this audience without at least a passing reference to the rather different meanings the U. N. evokes among partisans in the often passionate academic camps labeled "realism" and "idealism."

At another level—within the actual arena of the U. N. itself—symbolism plays a transcendently important role. Two examples will suffice. Can an overwhelming majority vote be rallied on the side of the free nations on a cold war issue? This tells our enemies of our solidarity and our determination. It speaks of present power and, if read with discrimination, potential force. Is a resolution debated which alludes, however vaguely, to the right of self-determination? This invokes all the dynamic passions of the newly independent states, as well as the cautions of those who administer non-self-governing territories. In addition it strikes a chord deep in the American spirit which reverberates dissonantly among the hard surfaces of our varied international responsibilities and commitments.

In this setting it can readily be seen that charter review offers a new focus for the expression of attitudes and desires which reach well below the surface. It is, in this sense, many things to many men. The job of the political scientist, I would suppose, is first to assign full weight to the implications with which every facet of the problem is freighted and then, having done that, to isolate and clearly identify the real and actionable components, divesting them of myth, passion, and fantasy as best one can.

The problem is thus at least in part one of methodology, a word that frightens at least one amateur in your ranks. To me the proper method is to start out with some basic assumptions, set limits to the field of inquiry, and pose the important questions in a way which is meaningful and constructive. For clearly there are as many ways of trying to penetrate this hard and unruly mass of intellectual material as there are political angles of vision—or political symbols.

Foundations and Boundaries

To guide the developing public debate into constructive channels the administration, while making no policy commitments other than to favor the holding of a review conference, has outlined its approach. Secretary Dulles earlier this year set

forth certain propositions as *a priori* assumptions.⁸ He established certain boundaries to encompass official planning. And he asked some of the questions that are likely to arise at a review conference and as to which he believed there should be an educated public opinion. The material containing the Secretary's statements is readily available to you, and as I do what I was really invited here to do—to ask some pertinent questions—I will be building on the foundation he has laid down.

First of all then, the foundation and the boundaries, as the State Department sees them. What actually is our problem? In the final analysis it is to see if there are changes in the U. N. Charter which would increase the chances for successfully organizing the sort of world we wish to live in.

What propositions do we start with? Here are some of them:

The U. N. is a vitally important instrumentality of American foreign policy. It is a means toward an end and not an end in itself. The ends are asserted in the purposes and principles of the charter, which in themselves constitute a valid restatement of the ideals which guide our own Nation in its long-range international outlook. There are a number of things about the U. N. and its charter that have sorely frustrated the American people. At the same time there is massive support for continued efforts to achieve the purposes embodied in the charter. The charter itself is by no means the villain in every case—it could probably carry as much traffic as the nations can agree upon. Already it has been possible to institutionalize certain practices on which the charter was not explicit. The real breakdowns stem from the pervasive reality of Soviet Communist hostility toward non-Communist society, toward the United States as its leader, and toward all efforts to strengthen the fabric of peace and security which cannot be redirected toward Communist ends.

There may be needful improvements in the charter on which we and friendly nations can agree. We know the Soviets can veto them, but we do not propose to do their negotiating for them in advance. We may have proposals for amendments and we may also have alternative suggestions, out of which one or the other may lead to the substantive objective we seek, particularly if world

opinion crystallizes around sound and reasonable proposals. Our Government sees an opportunity to take an important initiative. It has an open mind as to how best to exercise it. The emphasis at this stage is on *review*, not *revision*. We believe the U. N., as it is, is better than no U. N. at all. We do not think differences about how to strengthen the U. N. should be pressed to the point that the review conference would undermine or disrupt the U. N. An effort to write a brand new charter would open a Pandora's box and make it very hard indeed to reassemble anything resembling the present membership. Politics, in this view, is still the art of the possible.

These propositions are designed to establish a base on which the superstructure can rise. But there is yet another set of dimensions. To change the metaphor, these are the edges of the map on which we wish to plot a course. With our assumptions we have perhaps achieved an agreed scale for the map. If the extreme limits of the map can be defined, some agreed bearings can at least tentatively be located and, in the fullness of time, a course plotted.

Four Extremities

There seem to be four well-defined extremities. At one edge are the proposals to terminate the U. N. as an unsuccessful and possibly dangerous experiment, or at least to withdraw our own participation. At another are proposals to convert it into a tightly knit military alliance, obviously by expelling the Soviet bloc. At the third extreme are proposals to transform the U. N. into some kind of superstate. And at the fourth extreme are the views of those who for varying reasons wish the status to remain absolutely "quo," who see the review conference at best as a "punctuation" exercise, and who would prefer that we not even think about charter review.

So far as the State Department is concerned, Secretary Dulles has stated that he does not believe the first three extreme proposals are within the proper scope of a review conference. The fourth extreme—the status quo—cannot be dismissed offhand. The anxiety that underlies that position is genuine and often commands powerful reasoning. To it one can only reply that it would be a breach of trust with the many countries who were promised another look at the charter after

⁸ *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1954, p. 170.

10 years if, in a spirit of pessimism, we did not undertake a careful review. It would be as well a lack of confidence in our own national sobriety and inventiveness. If there are risks, can it be demonstrated that they clearly outweigh the possible opportunities? Surely, at the very least, there is great intrinsic value in the chance to understand better, through the process of review, the real configurations of this still new and indubitably influential force in world politics.

So we have moved in from the four boundaries to what we believe is a reasonable and manageable area. What does this tell us about how to ask the questions and define the real issues? First of all, it suggests that certain questions are, in this view, closed questions: "Should there be a U. N.?" "Should the U. S. be in it?" "Should it be drastically overhauled?" And—"Should there be a review conference?"

The pertinent questions arise from the broad issues and dilemmas in which they are imbedded. Broadly stated, these issues, and the stresses and strains which make them into issues, seem to me as follows:

The one that underlies all others is the profound hostility of world communism to the very concept of cooperation as we understand the word. The effort to create a "world community" confronts the inescapable truth that a community by definition consists of those who recognize that they share common interests which combine to form a general interest. This does not mean everyone must agree. It does suggest the expectation that each member will have a bona fide interest in furthering the community's collective purposes. When the U. N. Charter was drafted, it was supposed that, after the frightfulness of war, even the Soviet rulers would find it in their best interests to cooperate to keep the peace. Their performance has invalidated this assumption, and we recognize with lucidity the grave problems facing an organization whose effective functioning depends in some measure on cooperation with a regime dedicated to world domination.

Yet at the same time we have found it useful to have an organization which is, generally speaking, universal. It is clearly in our own interest to have an organization in which the free world meets the Communist world, remembering, of course, that some regimes such as the Chinese Communists so disregard accepted standards of

international conduct that they cannot properly be brought into organized international life. Anything short of an approximately universal organization would appear to many to forfeit the claim to be a world organization and would probably lose the support of many nations who set great store by an organization which does not require them to choose sides, wherever their real sympathies may lie. We ourselves have reaped important advantages from having this common meeting ground. We find it of tremendous value in presenting this country's views to the world as a whole. We may find it invaluable for dealing with the Soviets should they decide their real interests lie in peaceful cooperation instead of world domination.

Scope of Membership

With this as a backdrop, the first concrete issue concerns the scope of membership in the organization. The charter prescribes that membership is open to peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the charter and are able and willing to carry out these obligations. Nineteen applicants are awaiting admission. Fourteen of them have received a clear majority of votes but have been vetoed a total of 29 times by the Soviet Union. The other 5 states—or rather 4 states and Outer Mongolia—sponsored by the Soviets, have never received a majority of votes. In the light of this stalemate one must ask: Does article 4 express the desirable standards for admission? And should we implement the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948 by proposing the elimination of the veto on admission of new members?

Another major issue is how nations in today's world can organize for collective action to keep the peace. In an age of profound tensions and tremendous concentrations of power—an age, that is to say, of collective insecurity—the question of collective security is paramount. In drafting the charter it was apparent that the powers which would have the greatest responsibility would be unwilling to be committed to armed action without their consent. This was certainly true of the U. S., and anything else would have been unthinkable under our constitutional processes. Given the emergence after the war of only a handful of nations with really decisive power in the world, it was supposed that unless they were in

agreement, action against an aggressor was impossible. Hence the Big Power veto in the Security Council on peace-enforcement action.

From the vantage point of 1954 we see that it has been possible to explore some untapped resources in the charter. We ourselves have taken the lead in building into the veto-free General Assembly some means, however imperfect, for taking collective action against aggression. How can we continue to develop truly effective machinery for collective defense against aggression within a world organization that must reflect the world as it is, not as we should like it to be? Should the Security Council formally yield its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security to the General Assembly, or to regional and other collective defense arrangements authorized by the charter?

Of course, in blueprinting more effective and automatic methods of collective security action, we must always ask how far we ourselves are prepared to go and how much freedom of action we are willing to surrender in exchange for an equal willingness on the part of other nations. In this connection we recall that in the General Assembly each nation has only one vote. If the Assembly is to acquire greater responsibilities, a basic question will be whether the "one nation, one vote" formula is adequate in the face of vastly different scales of responsibility as among nations for action to keep the peace. If it is not adequate, how can it be improved upon? Should there be some form of weighted voting to reflect more realistically the actual distribution of power?

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

Another major issue flows from the last one. It is not always a question of wars. And it is not always a question involving the hostility of world communism. There are disputes and situations threatening the peace which result from clashes of the interests or the prestige of nations. The search for methods of peacefully settling such disputes must continue. Already real progress has been made in our lifetime. The record of the U. N. is good, always remembering that in the disputes which have been pacified there was a willingness on both sides at least to consider peaceful solutions that saved the face of both.

There is of course a Great Power veto on the peaceful settlement of disputes. But for our

strenuous objections there might have been a veto over free discussion of the cases, and also as a consequence of Western exertions at San Francisco a party to a dispute, whether a Great Power or not, cannot vote on that case. But as a result of the gross abuse of the veto power by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly has more and more been the forum before which disputes and situations are brought, just as it is the organ to which this country and others have turned increasingly for developing collective defenses against aggression.

Can we devise more effective methods of getting parties to settle their disputes peacefully and to abide by the judgments of international bodies? Should we also here implement the Vandenberg Resolution calling for elimination of the veto on pacific settlement matters? How can we get a rule of law to which nations will subscribe in their own best interests? What can be done to encourage the real development of international law in the face of the profound clash of value systems in the world?

In thinking about disputes and situations threatening the peace we must bear in mind the new dimension this problem has today. Alongside the traditional quarrels of sovereign nations are the problems arising out of the breakup of colonial empires and the dynamic drive of dependent territories toward self-government and equal treatment. More and more these questions take the center of the stage in the U. N. The Trusteeship Council was designed to deal with the administration of trust territories, and its composition was carefully balanced between nations with the responsibility of administration and nations without that responsibility. But apart from trust territories there are many dependent territories administered chiefly by our closest friends among Western European and British Commonwealth nations. The tensions and passions arising from these changing relationships are focused largely on the Assembly, where many newly freed nations and their supporters give these so-called colonial issues their primary attention.

Social and Economic Problems

In addition to its specific functions directed toward keeping the peace and conciliating political and territorial disputes among nations, the U. N. is a forum for a host of worldwide social and eco-

nomic as well as political problems. Although the specialized agencies and the Economic and Social Council were created to deal with these problems, increasingly they have been issues in the Assembly.

Thus, alongside its growing functions in the field of security and peaceful settlement, the Assembly deals with colonial issues, world price levels and full employment, human rights and freedom of information, food surpluses and economic development, and a host of other diverse matters. As we noted earlier, many of those have become vital symbols of the aspirations of less-favored nations, sometimes putting in the shadows what are to us overriding problems of peace and security. Our own record of support for self-government or independence of dependent peoples is one of which we have no cause to be ashamed. We have a vital interest in seeing that there is adequate machinery to assist in the process of peaceful change and to direct into orderly and constructive channels the explosive pressures built up in this field. We also attach tremendous importance to the possibilities of constructive cooperation for economic and social betterment of peoples. With all this in mind, is there a better way of organizing the work of the U. N., and between the U. N. and the specialized agencies to avoid duplication, confusion, lack of controls, and what might be called organizational exacerbation of tensions?

The next major issue stems from the last and has to do with the scope and powers of the U. N. itself. We see that it has become a forum and in some cases an action body for a whole gamut of world problems, social and economic as well as political. The question of scope is not limited to the General Assembly's powers and jurisdiction, although the question arises there most frequently. Article 2 (7) of the charter restrains the U. N. as a whole from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. This

has become a prime issue. Nations which are impatient with conditions elsewhere are increasingly inclined to overlook the distinction. This is a very dangerous path and endangers the whole foundation of the organization, which after all was joined voluntarily by sovereign states for the pursuit of common interests that are clearly defined in the charter. Where should the line be drawn? Is it now adequately drawn?

Regulation of Armaments

In one sense overshadowing all other issues is the question of regulation of armaments. This cannot be dealt with in a vacuum. Real disarmament can come about only when it is in the interest of all to disarm. But the present arms race is unique in the unimaginable destructiveness of modern weapons. Every avenue must be explored. Perhaps alterations in the charter will do nothing to change the motivation of the Soviet Union, whose avowed hostility is the prime cause of our own rearmament efforts. But we cannot afford not to try. We continue to believe that it is in the clear interest of all nations (including ourselves) to submit to a universal scheme of safeguarded disarmament. Is the U. N. susceptible of any improvements which would make their own self-interest in this goal even more manifest to all nations? Are there any changes in the charter that would enhance the prospect of successfully dealing with this monumental issue—the creation of a new major organ, for example.

These seem to me to be the basic issues. They are the principal areas of stress and strain as we have experienced them in 9 years of operation. Thoughtful and realistic consideration of these issues can carry us a long way on the path of understanding the problems of charter review.

The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as Amended

by Frank L. Auerbach

With the President's signature on August 31, 1954, amendments to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953¹ became effective which in general liberalize the relief measure significantly. These amendments,² passed in the closing days of the 83d Congress, (1) permit special nonquota visas authorized for certain persons of Italian, Greek, or Dutch origin to be issued to applicants in either the refugee or relative preference group, according to the current demand; (2) remove in the case of eligible orphans the requirement that the country of visa issuance furnish a certificate guaranteeing readmission if the visa was secured fraudulently; (3) broaden the definition of refugees within the United States who may adjust their status to that of permanent residents being unable to return to the country of their birth, nationality, or last residence because of fear of persecution, and include within this group aliens brought from other American Republics for internment during World War II; and (4) require the submission of certificates of housing and employment in the case of Italian, Greek, and Dutch relatives who are issued visas from the number originally allotted to Italian, Greek, or Dutch refugees.

The Refugee Relief Act, hailed by the President at the time of its enactment in August 1953 as a significant humanitarian act and an important contribution toward a greater understanding and cooperation among the free nations of the world, permits 214,000 aliens to become permanent

Editor's Note. This article brings up to date Mr. Auerbach's article entitled "The Refugee Relief Act of 1953," which appeared in the *Bulletin* of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 231.

¹ Public Law 203, 83d Cong.

² Public Law 751, 83d Cong.

residents of the United States. Of these, 205,000 are refugees from Communist persecution and natural calamity and close relatives of American citizens and of permanent resident aliens in the United States; 4,000 are orphans; and 5,000 are aliens who have come to the United States as non-immigrants and, under the conditions specified in the law, are permitted to acquire permanent residence status if they cannot return abroad because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.

Immigrant visas authorized under the Refugee Relief Act are in addition to those authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act. They may be issued until December 31, 1956.

Classes of Aliens Eligible for Relief

In defining the classes of aliens who may benefit under its provisions, the law differentiates between "refugees" and "escapees."

"Refugee" means any person in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Communist-dominated who because of persecution, fear of persecution, national calamity, or military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return thereto, who has not been formally resettled, and who is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life or for transportation. "Escapee" means any refugee who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, fled from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or other Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied areas of Europe, including those parts of Germany under military occupation of the U.S.S.R., and who cannot return thereto because of fear of per-

secution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.

The following classes of aliens, if otherwise qualified, may be issued special nonquota visas:

1. *German Expellees*—A total of 55,000 visas may be issued to German expellees residing in the area of the German Federal Republic, in the western sector of Berlin, or in Austria. German expellees are refugees of German ethnic origin who were born in and were forced to flee from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, or areas provisionally under the administration or control or domination of any such countries, except the Soviet Zone of military occupation of Germany.

2. *Escapees in Germany and Austria*—A total of 35,000 visas may be issued to escapees residing in the area of the German Federal Republic, the western sector of Berlin, or Austria.³

3. *Escapees in NATO Countries*—A total of 10,000 visas may be issued to escapees residing within the European continental limits of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or in Turkey, Sweden, Iran, or in the Free Territory of Trieste who are not nationals of the area in which they reside.³

4. *Polish Veterans*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to refugees who during World War II were members of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland and were honorably discharged from these forces, and who resided on August 7, 1953, in the British Isles and have not acquired British citizenship.

5. *Italian Refugees*—A total of 45,000 visas may be issued to refugees of Italian ethnic origin who resided on August 7, 1953, in Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste. In addition, the 15,000 visas authorized for issuance to Italian relatives, described in the following paragraph, may be made available to Italian refugees.

6. *Italian Relatives*—A total of 15,000 visas may be issued to persons of Italian ethnic origin

who resided on August 7, 1953, in Italy or in the Free Territory of Trieste who, being close relatives of American citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, are entitled to preference quota status under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.⁴ In addition, the 45,000 visas authorized for issuance to Italian refugees, described in the preceding paragraph, may be made available to Italian relatives. The provision of the amended act that the original quota allocation for refugees and relatives may be made available interchangeably to both classes of aliens will benefit primarily Greek and Italian relatives. As of September 3, 1954, the original allotment of 15,000 visas to Italian relatives was virtually exhausted, with approximately 20,000 additional relative applications on file. Developments indicate that the 45,000 visas originally allotted to Italian refugees will not be used up by this group so that the unused portion of these visas will be available to Italian relatives. A similar situation exists in regard to Greek refugees and relatives. On the other hand, it does not appear likely that the allotment for Dutch relatives and refugees will be exhausted by either group inasmuch as the regular immigration quota of the Netherlands is adequate to meet the demand of nearly all current Dutch relative applications.

7. *Greek Refugees*—A total of 15,000 visas may be issued to refugees of Greek ethnic origin who resided on August 7, 1953, in Greece. In addition, the 2,000 visas authorized for issuance to Greek relatives, described in the following paragraph, may be made available to Greek refugees.

8. *Greek Relatives*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to persons of Greek ethnic origin who resided on August 7, 1953, in Greece who, being close relatives of American citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, are entitled to preference quota status under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

³ Many escapees under the jurisdiction of the Office for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary Assistance of the Foreign Operations Administration are expected to qualify for the benefits of this provision. The Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program cooperates closely with the Director of that Office in the Foreign Operations Administration to facilitate processing for resettlement of these escapees.

⁴ Relatives entitled to preference quota status are parents of American citizens; spouses and children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; brothers and sisters of American citizens; and sons and daughters of American citizens who are married or 21 years of age or older. Unmarried children of American citizens who are under 21 years of age are not subject to quota restrictions. For an analysis of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 195, and Feb. 9, 1953, p. 232.

In addition, the 15,000 visas authorized for issuance to Greek refugees, described in the preceding paragraph, may be made available to Greek relatives.

9. *Dutch Refugees*—A total of 15,000 visas may be issued to refugees of Dutch ethnic origin who resided on August 7, 1953, in the continental Netherlands. In addition, the 2,000 visas authorized for issuance to Dutch relatives, described in the following paragraph, may be made available to Dutch refugees.

10. *Dutch Relatives*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to persons of Dutch ethnic origin who resided on August 7, 1953, in the continental Netherlands who, being close relatives of American citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, are entitled to preference quota status under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In addition, the 15,000 visas authorized for issuance to Dutch refugees, described in the preceding paragraph, may be made available to Dutch relatives.

11. *Far East Refugees (Non-Asian)*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to refugees residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East who are not indigenous to the Far East.

12. *Far East Refugees (Asian)*—A total of 3,000 visas may be issued to refugees residing within the district of an American consular office in the Far East who are indigenous to the Far East.

13. *Chinese Refugees*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin whose passports for travel to the United States are endorsed by the Chinese Nationalist Government or its authorized representatives.

14. *Arab Refugees*—A total of 2,000 visas may be issued to refugees who on August 7, 1953, were eligible to receive assistance from the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

15. *Orphans*—A total of 4,000 visas may be issued to eligible orphans who are under 10 years of age at the time the visa is issued. A child qualifies for a visa as an orphan only if the quota to which he would otherwise be chargeable is oversubscribed and if he has been lawfully adopted abroad by an American citizen and spouse or if a U.S. citizen and spouse have given assurances that once he is admitted to the United States, they

will adopt him in the United States and will care for him properly. A child is considered an orphan only if he has lost both parents through death, disappearance, abandonment or desertion, or separation, or if he has lost one of his parents due to one of these circumstances and the remaining parent is incapable of providing proper care and has released the child irrevocably for emigration.

16. *Nonimmigrants in the United States*—A total of 5,000 nonimmigrants in the United States may apply before July 1, 1955, to the Attorney General for adjustment of their status to that of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence if they can show that they either: (a) lawfully entered the United States prior to July 1, 1953, as bona fide nonimmigrants and are unable to return to the country of their birth, or nationality, or last residence because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion; or (b) were brought to the United States from other American Republics for internment.

Included in the number of visas authorized for each of the groups listed above in categories (1) to (14) are the husband, wife, and unmarried minor sons and daughters who accompany the principal applicant. Stepsons and stepdaughters, as well as sons and daughters adopted before July 1, 1953, are also eligible to receive visas. For example, a German expellee who qualifies for a visa under the act may—within the numerical limitation described above—bring with him his wife and child regardless of the fact that they are not themselves expellees; and a person of Italian ethnic origin who, as the brother of an American citizen, is entitled to fourth-preference quota status may bring with him his wife and children although they themselves are not entitled to such preference quota status.

Place of Visa Issuance

Visas authorized under the Refugee Relief Act as a rule may be issued to each class of aliens only in the area specified in the law for each class. For example, visas authorized for German expellees may be issued only in the German Federal Republic, in the western sector of Berlin, or in Austria; visas authorized for Dutch relatives or refugees may be issued only in continental Netherlands. This rule does not apply in the case of Polish war veterans, Chinese refugees, and orphans; visas for

persons in these categories may be issued wherever an application is properly received by an American consular officer.

Security Provisions

The Refugee Relief Act is an emergency relief measure designed to implement certain phases of American foreign policy; it is not an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Thus, an alien applying for a visa and for admission into the United States under the new measure must be found eligible under the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.⁵

The new act provides for the following additional safeguards in the interest of the security of the United States:

1. Each applicant for a visa, except an orphan, must have documents assuring his readmission to the country of his nationality or foreign residence, or to the place where he obtains his visa, in the event he is denied admission to the United States or, after entry to this country, is found to have obtained a visa by fraud or by misrepresenting a material fact.

2. A thorough investigation and written report concerning each applicant for a visa by an investigative agency of the U.S. Government are required before a visa may be issued.

3. Each applicant, in addition to being examined by a consular officer for his eligibility to receive a visa, is examined abroad, as well as at the time of arrival in the United States, by an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning the question of his admissibility. Issuance of a visa is prohibited unless complete information is available regarding the history of the applicant covering a period of at least 2 years immediately preceding his application. Exceptions are provided in national interest cases.

4. Each alien before being issued a visa must subscribe an oath or affirmation that he is not and has never been an anarchist, Communist, or a member of the Communist Party or any other party or organization proscribed for the purposes of the immigration laws.

5. Visa issuance is prohibited to any person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution

of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or national origin.

6. An alien may be issued a visa and admitted to the United States only if his eligibility is clearly established on the basis of affirmative evidence.

Commenting on the security provisions of the measure when it was considered by the House of Representatives, Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, in a letter to Rep. Patrick J. Hillings of California,⁶ stated in part:

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act the consul may withhold the visa only if he knows or has reason to believe that the applicant is inadmissible under one or more excluding provisions of the act. Under the provisions of the act now being considered, the consul may withhold the visa on the mere basis that sufficient information is not available to determine, reasonably, the applicant's eligibility and admissibility. The security provisions under the proposed act are stronger than under any present or former immigration laws. Any doubt that may exist will be resolved against the applicant and in favor of the United States.

Assurances and Certificates

As a rule, assurances by a citizen or citizens of the United States must be submitted for each refugee wishing to benefit from the Refugee Relief Act. Such assurances must show that the alien will be suitably employed without displacing some other person from employment, and that he and the members of his family will not become public charges and will have housing without displacing some other person from such housing. The assurance of employment is required for the principal applicant but not for his spouse or unmarried minor sons and daughters. Assurances are acceptable only if they are submitted by a responsible individual citizen or citizens. So-called "blanket assurances" are not considered satisfactory. The law specifies that each assurance is a personal obligation of the individual citizen or citizens giving or submitting it. In giving an assurance the assurer may act in his own behalf, in behalf of a church, welfare agency, or other bona fide group of citizens, or in behalf of a noncitizen.

The assurances of employment and housing and against his becoming a public charge have a special value to the immigrant because they guarantee

⁵ For a listing of classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas and excludable from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 234.

⁶ Cong. Rec. of July 28, 1953, p. 10364.

that adequate plans have been made for him and his family before their departure from abroad.

In the case of Italian, Greek, and Dutch relatives who are issued visas from the number of visas originally allotted to Italian, Greek, and Dutch refugees, a certificate of employment and housing must be presented to the responsible consular officer showing that the alien will have in the United States suitable employment and housing without displacing any other person therefrom. In the case of Italian, Greek, and Dutch relatives of American citizens and of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who are issued visas from the number originally allotted to them, any satisfactory evidence that they will not become public charges is acceptable.

In the case of orphans special assurance forms are prescribed showing that if admitted to the United States the orphan will be cared for properly, and, if not yet adopted abroad, will be adopted in this country.

Special assurance and certificate forms have been prescribed by regulations and may be obtained from the Visa Office of the Department of State, from any district office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or from any voluntary or other recognized agency which performs services in connection with the immigration, settlement, or welfare of aliens.

Visa Priorities

If more aliens apply for issuance of visas than can be handled currently on a day-by-day basis, priority is given to consideration of:

1. Persons whose services or skills are needed in the United States and who are to be employed in a capacity calling for such services or such skills; and to

2. Persons who are parents of American citizens; husbands, wives, and unmarried minor sons and daughters of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, including stepsons, stepdaughters, and sons and daughters adopted before July 1, 1953; and brothers, sisters, sons, and daughters of American citizens.

The fact that an alien may have been found preliminarily eligible under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, does not confer on him a right to privileged consideration of his case under the new law.

Intergovernmental Arrangements and Loans

The Secretary of State is authorized to make arrangements with foreign governments and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration for the purpose of financing the overseas transportation of persons who may be issued visas under the act. Such arrangements, which should be mutually beneficial to the economies of the United States and the countries concerned as well as to the prospective immigrant, should seek to enable these persons to transfer into dollar currency personal assets necessary for defraying the cost of transportation and for use in the United States.

Loans not to exceed 5 million dollars may be made by the Secretary of the Treasury to public or private agencies of the United States for the purpose of financing the transportation from ports of entry in the United States to the places at which persons receiving visas under the act are to be resettled. Such loans will mature not later than June 30, 1963, and bear 3 percent interest on the unpaid balance from the maturity date until final payment.

Administration of Refugee Relief Act

Primary responsibility for the administration of the Refugee Relief Act and the coordination of activities of the various government agencies participating in the administration rests with the Administrator of the Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State. The Administrator is responsible for the allocation of funds among the various agencies of the Government concerned with the operations of the refugee relief program. He also supervises the activities of the various divisions within the Department of State and of the Foreign Service as far as they relate to the program.

Assurances of employment, housing, and against becoming a public charge are to be submitted to the Administrator, who verifies their authenticity and bona fides and then forwards them to the appropriate consular office abroad. Certificates of employment and housing in the case of Italian, Greek, and Dutch refugees are to be submitted directly to the appropriate consular officer. Responsibility for the final acceptance and approval of the assurances and certificates rests with the consular officers and immigration officers.

With the Administrator acting as a coordinator, five agencies of the Government, in addition to the Department of State, participate in the administration of the act.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice has sent abroad a group of immigration officers who are attached to the consular offices operating under the program and who inspect the aliens abroad to determine their admissibility into the United States. The adjustment of status to that of permanent resident aliens of 5,000 nonimmigrants in the United States is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The U.S. Employment Service and its affiliated State employment services make findings and recommendations with regard to the authenticity and bona fides of assurances of employment. Overseas representatives of the U.S. Employment Service determine aliens' occupational skills and their suitability to fill job orders.

The U.S. Public Health Service is responsible for the medical examination of aliens applying for visas under the act, as it is under the regular immigration laws.

The Counterintelligence Corps of the Department of the Army conducts security investigations concerning visa applicants in areas where it functions.

The Department of the Treasury, as stated above, makes loans for the financing of inland transportation of immigrants.

The Administrator of the Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs is required to report to the President and the Congress on the operations of the Refugee Relief Act semiannually and to submit a final report not later than June 15, 1957. On July 27, 1954, the Administrator appointed Antonio A. Micocci as Deputy Administrator for the Refugee Relief Program, succeeding Robert C. Alexander, who had held this position from its inception until his retirement. The Deputy Administrator carries major responsibilities for the coordination and administration of the act.

The Department of State and the other agencies of the U.S. Government entrusted with the administration of the Refugee Relief Act have issued regulations, instructions, and forms in implementation of the act. Specific information on the procedure to be followed in bringing aliens to the

United States under the act may be obtained from American consular officers abroad or from the Visa Office, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Requests for information concerning the adjustment of status of nonimmigrants already in the United States may be addressed to any office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice.

Cooperation With State and Voluntary Agencies

In an effort to bring the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act to the attention of the American community, the Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program has enlisted the cooperation of voluntary agencies active in the field of immigration and resettlement of aliens. Twenty-five such agencies have so far been recognized—five for the program as a whole and 20 for all phases of the program except that relating to orphans. A list of these agencies is appended.

In response to a recent request by President Eisenhower,⁷ who in 1953 had personally urged the enactment of the Refugee Relief Act, 33 Governors have agreed to organize committees for the purpose of obtaining employment, housing, and assistance in the resettlement for aliens who will come to this country under the act. These Governor's Advisory Committees for Refugee Relief are functioning or are in the process of organization in the following States: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming.

APPENDIX

Recognized Voluntary Agencies as of September 9, 1954

1. American Aid for Expellees and Immigration,*
11 Paterson Street,
Newark, N.J.

⁷ BULLETIN of Aug. 16, 1954, p. 239.

*Nonorphan cases only.

2. The American Branch of the International Social Service, Inc.,
345 East Forty-sixth Street,
New York 17, N.Y.
3. American Committee for Resettlement of Polish DPs,*
1520 West Division Street,
Chicago 22, Ill.
4. American Federation of International Institutes, Inc.,*
11 West Forty-second Street,
New York 36, N.Y.
5. The American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc.,*
1775 Broadway, Room 607,
New York 19, N.Y.
6. American Latvian Association in the United States, Inc.,*
3220 Seventeenth Street, NW.,
Washington 10, D.C.
7. American National Committee To Aid Homeless Armenians,
207 Powell Street,
San Francisco 2, Calif.
8. American Resettlement Council for Italian Refugees,*
136 West Fifty-second Street,
New York, N.Y.
9. Baptist World Alliance Relief Committee,*
Displaced Persons Resettlement Program,
1628 Sixteenth Street, NW.,
Washington 9, D.C.
10. Calvinist Resettlement Service of the Christian Reformed Church,*
816 Sigsbee Street, Southeast,
Grand Rapids 6, Mich.
11. Catholic Committee for Refugees,
265 West Fourteenth Street,
New York 11, N.Y.
12. Church World Service,
215 Fourth Avenue,
New York 3, N.Y.
13. Federation of Russian Charitable Organizations of the United States,*
376 Twentieth Avenue,
San Francisco 21, Calif.
14. Greek American Progressive Association,*
39 Broadway,
New York, N.Y.
15. International Rescue Committee, Inc.,*
62 West Forty-fifth Street,
New York 36, N.Y.
16. National Lutheran Council,*
21 East Twenty-sixth Street,
New York 10, N.Y.
17. Order of Ahepa, Refugee Relief Committee,*
16 Beaver Street,
New York 4, N.Y.
18. Romanian Welfare, Inc.,*
18 East Sixtieth Street,
New York 22, N.Y.
19. Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.,*
300 West Fifty-eighth Street,
New York 19, N.Y.

*Nonorphan cases only.

20. United Community Services of Metropolitan Detroit,
51 Warren Avenue,
Detroit 1, Mich. (Michigan cases only)
21. United Friends of Needy and Displaced People of Yugoslavia, Inc.,*
487 Onderdonk Avenue,
Brooklyn 37, N.Y.
22. United Hiaas Service, Inc.,
425 Lafayette Street,
New York 3, N.Y.
23. United Ukrainian American Relief Committee,*
P. O. Box 1661,
Philadelphia, Pa.
24. War Relief Services,
National Catholic Welfare Conference,
149 Madison Avenue,
New York 16, N.Y.
25. Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, Inc.,*
1790 Broadway,
New York 19, N.Y.

• Mr. Auerbach, author of the above article, is Special Assistant to the Director, Visa Office, Department of State.

Review Hearings on GATT

*Statement by Samuel C. Waugh
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

In a message to Congress on March 30, 1954,² the President stated his intention to renegotiate the organizational provisions of the GATT and to submit the results of this renegotiation to the Congress for its approval. He stated further that the United States will "suggest to other contracting parties revisions of the substantive provisions of the agreement to provide a simpler, stronger instrument contributing more effectively to the development of a workable system of world trade."

As directed by the President, the United States delegation, which included representatives of the appropriate agencies of the executive branch, discussed the merits of a review of the agreement with other GATT adherents. There was general agreement that a review of the agreement in the light of experience since it was first put into effect

¹ Made at the opening of review hearings on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at Washington, D. C., on Sept. 13 (press release 507).

² BULLETIN of April 19, 1954, p. 602.

in 1948 is now appropriate, and the review is scheduled to open in Geneva on November 8.

The hearings which we are opening this morning are being conducted to obtain the views of interested Americans regarding this review of the GATT. These views together with the written statements submitted will be given careful consideration in the formulation of the United States position and instructions to the United States delegation.

It is the practice of the executive branch in the field of economic foreign policy to draw upon the specialized knowledge and skills of those agencies concerned with various aspects of our policy. In consequence, the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture as well as State are represented on this panel, and these and other agencies also participate in the formulation and execution of our economic foreign policy. The panel membership also includes members of the Congress and representatives of the public.

While the United States and other countries participating in the GATT review may suggest changes in any of the provisions of the agreement, the problems which are of most importance have been listed in the press release of August 21 announcing these hearings.³ They are the following:

1. The organizational provisions of the GATT.
2. The problem of special treatment for underdeveloped countries.
3. The problems arising out of agricultural quotas and export subsidies.
4. The provisions relating to the imposition of import restrictions for balance of payments reasons.
5. The provisions relating to the duration of tariff concessions.

A word or two about each of these problems may be helpful.

Organization

The contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade now have no regular organization to apply their agreement nor has the GATT a permanent secretariat. In order to apply the agreement, the contracting parties now rely on transacting business at periodic meetings and on exchanges of views through diplomatic

channels. Between regular sessions of the contracting parties, recommendations on items of urgent business are developed by an International Committee consisting of a limited group of GATT countries, including the United States. There is a general feeling among the contracting parties that the GATT as now constituted lacks effective organizational arrangements to deal on a continuing and prompt basis with the many problems which arise in the field of international trade.

The question now confronting governments in the GATT is what to do about this situation. Many countries would like to establish a permanent organization with an adequate secretariat. The question before us is: What should be the structure of such an organization, and what functions and powers should it have?

Underdeveloped Countries

The less economically developed countries aspire to accelerate their industrialization. Many feel that their tariffs were set without regard for such needs and, in consequence, that they are at a relative disadvantage in following trade rules identical with those followed by the industrially advanced countries. In general, such countries wish to be free to apply such measures as quantitative restrictions and higher duties in order to facilitate the development and growth of new industries.

The interests of the United States and of free-world security would be advanced by a more rapid and sound economic development of these countries. Even from a purely trade point of view, the more economically advanced countries with higher living standards are generally better customers.

There are now special provisions in the GATT relating to the treatment of underdeveloped countries. The question is: To what extent can the GATT provisions be responsive to the needs of underdeveloped countries without being unduly prejudicial to the trade interests and economies of other countries or affording uneconomic protection to special interests?

Agricultural Provisions

While the GATT now contains provisions on agricultural import quotas and export subsidies, many countries in the GATT feel that these provisions are inadequate.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1954, p. 310.

The United States has itself a twofold interest in agricultural provisions in the GATT. On the one hand, it wishes to assure itself adequate leeway to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent imports from impairing its domestic farm programs. On the other hand, it wishes to protect its agricultural exports against arbitrary and restrictive measures which might be imposed by other countries.

The problem is to find means of dealing with this matter in a way that satisfies these dual objectives. What provisions should the GATT contain which, while giving countries adequate latitude to safeguard their domestic programs, at the same time provide reasonable protection to exporting interests? What provisions could be adopted which would be fair and equitable both to countries needing to resort to agricultural import quotas and export subsidies and to countries which might be affected by such measures?

Import Restrictions

The GATT now permits countries to apply import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons. Such restrictions are intended to conserve a country's foreign exchange. During the postwar period when countries were short of foreign currencies and found it impracticable to take other corrective measures, they extensively applied restrictions on imports in order to limit the drain on their monetary reserves and protect their external financial position. Since imports from the United States and other hard currency areas required payment in American dollars or other exchange which was lacking, imports from such areas were particularly subject to restrictions. The problem is to ascertain what changes, if any, are desirable in the light of the improved payments position of many of the more highly developed countries of the world.

Tariff Concessions

One of the contributions which it is felt the GATT has made is the provision of a substantial stability in tariff levels throughout the world. These tariff commitments have had the effect of restraining arbitrary, sudden, and sweeping increases in rates adversely affecting the interests of other countries.

The GATT, however, contains a provision which would permit countries unilaterally to increase

duties after a certain date. This provision has never come into operation, the date having been extended on two occasions, the latest extension expiring on June 30, 1955.

The United States and other countries are concerned that there be no unraveling of the tariff concessions and a consequent upsetting of the wide measure of tariff stability which has been achieved. There is also concern that the agreement provide adequate flexibility to meet exceptional circumstances which countries may face. The problem, therefore, is to find a way of providing such flexibility and still preserve the stability of tariff rates achieved under the GATT.

The forthcoming negotiations may well decide not only the future of GATT but also the future of free-world trade policy. We must seek to formulate a policy we can live with—one which makes it possible for us and our friends abroad to work toward an expansion of mutually profitable world trade.

Rejection of Higher Duties on Hand-Blown Glassware

White House Office press release dated September 9

The President on September 9 declined to accept the recommendations of three members of the U.S. Tariff Commission for higher duties on certain hand-blown glassware.

The Tariff Commission made an investigation into the effect of trade agreement concessions on hand-blown glassware pursuant to section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. In its report¹ the Commission was equally divided. Three Commissioners found that certain hand-blown glassware is being imported into this country in such increased quantities as to threaten serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. The other three Commissioners found no basis for recommending increased duties. Under the law such split decisions are forwarded to the President for resolution.

The President, in identical letters to Senator Eugene D. Millikin, Chairman of the Finance

¹ Copies of the Tariff Commission report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D. C.

Committee, and Representative Daniel A. Reed, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, stated his belief that "the fundamental cause of the difficulties of this industry lies in competition offered by machine-made glassware to both imported and domestic handmade ware." In his view the problems experienced by domestic producers in recent years have not been the result of the trade agreement duty concession but mainly of the technological change in this field which has led to a change of consumer preference from traditional hand-blown ware to cheaper machine-made ware.

Text of the President's Letter

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you were advised in my earlier letter² in connection with the report of the United States Tariff Commission on its "escape clause" investigation with respect to certain hand-blown glassware, I asked the Commission for additional information on several points on which clarification seemed essential to a final decision in the case. The Commission's reply indicated the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory information on the points raised.

All members of the Commission are agreed that the problem of import competition arises only in hand-blown table and art glassware, mainly stemware. Three of the Commissioners declare that imports have been increasing under the tariff concessions granted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the extent of causing serious injury to domestic producers. They urge not only that the trade agreement concession be withdrawn, but that the basic rates in operation on January 1, 1945 be increased by one-half, the maximum permissible. The rates that would then come into operation would be: 90 per cent ad valorem on plain hand-blown table and art glassware with an invoice value up to \$3. per piece, and on cut or engraved ware up to \$1. per piece, and 67½ per cent ad valorem on cut or engraved ware valued from \$1. to \$3.

The three other Commissioners take the position that such decline in business as has been experienced by the domestic producers in recent years has been the result not of the trade agreement reduction in duty, but rather of the long-continued

technological change in this field, which has led consumers to shift their purchases from the traditional hand-blown ware to the increasingly attractive and much less expensive machine-made glassware.

After the closest possible study of the situation on the basis of the data available, I believe that the fundamental cause of the difficulties of this industry lies in competition offered by machine-made glassware to both imported and domestic hand-made ware. In 1937 total consumption in the United States of hand-blown table and art glassware, including imported glass, amounted to 7.2 million dozen pieces, or about one-fifth the amount of machine-made tumblers and stemware produced in that year. Fifteen years later, in 1952, the population of the United States had increased by nearly one-fourth. Years of unprecedented prosperity had helped to make possible the establishment of many new households, and millions of others had been re-equipped in keeping with a higher standard of living. The total consumption of machine-made tumblers and stemware had increased by sixty per cent so that it totaled 65 million dozen pieces in 1952 as compared with 40 million in 1937. Yet hand-blown glassware consumption had fallen during the interval by nearly 60 per cent to only 3 million dozen pieces instead of 7 millions. This decline was moreover one in which both imports and domestic production suffered. A post-war resumption of imports ended the abnormal war-time domination of the market by domestic production with a result that imports increased steadily after 1946. However, imports did not come close to regaining their pre-war volume and in 1952, according to latest data given in the Tariff Commission report, amounted to 910,000 dozen pieces as compared with an estimated 2,000,000 dozen pieces in 1937. Although the available data are inconclusive, it appears that up to the end of 1952 imports supplied no larger a share of the total domestic market than they had done in 1937. If, as is estimated, some 2,000,000 dozen pieces were imported in 1937, those imports were about 37 per cent of the total consumption in the United States in that year. The 910,000 dozen pieces imported in 1952 amounted to just about that same proportion of the reduced total consumption in that year.

It would appear that the difficulty confronting this industry is not the duty concession but a

² BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 823.

rapidly shrinking consumer market. In that situation no amount of change in duty can avoid the necessity of domestic producers of hand-blown table and art glassware finding means of preparing themselves to meet the changes in industrial techniques and consumer preferences that are inescapable in a dynamic economy such as ours. It would appear that the most promising approach lies in the direction of finding those specialities or other products which it is within the ability of the industry to make and for which a profitable market in the United States can be sustained. I am informed that a number of firms in the industry have already initiated steps in that direction.

Added tariff protection offers no comparable real benefit in my opinion. It might offer some short-term relief. That relief would, however, cloud the issues as to the industry's long-run needs. By postponing the needed changes, it would tend also to discourage product and market research. For these reasons I have decided not to increase the duties on hand-made glassware.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Trout-Labeling Bill Vetoed

Statement by the President

White House Office press release dated September 2

I am withholding my approval from S. 2033, "Relating to the labeling of packages containing foreign-produced trout sold in the United States, and requiring certain information to appear in public eating places serving such trout."

The bill would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by making its criminal sanctions—imprisonment up to 3 years or a fine up to \$1,000, or both—and certain civil sanctions applicable to the sale, offering for sale, possessing for sale, or serving of foreign-produced trout in violation of special provisions which the bill would add to the act with respect to such trout, except a certain species of lake trout largely imported from Canada. (These special requirements would be in addition to any of the other requirements of the act and to any applicable requirements of State law.)

These special requirements—none of them applicable to domestic trout—are as follows:

1. Foreign-produced trout would have to be packaged and, if the package is broken while held for sale, each unit for sale consisting of one or more trout would have to be in a separate package.

2. Each such package would have to be clearly and conspicuously stamped or labeled, in type or lettering of specified size, with the word "trout" preceded by the name of the country in which such trout was produced.

3. It would be unlawful for any restaurant or other public eating place to possess, in a form ready for serving, any foreign-produced trout unless the restaurant or eating place displayed prominently and conspicuously a notice stating that "_____ trout is served in this restaurant," with the name of the country of origin inserted in the blank space.

According to the Committee reports, the bill has the threefold purpose of (1) protecting the public and consumer against deceptive and unfair acts and practices by requiring truthful disclosure of the origin of the trout being sold, (2) protecting our domestic trout producers against unfair competition from foreign producers of trout, and (3) protecting our source of supply for stocking the streams of our Nation with game trout.

It is claimed that in recent years certain merchants and restaurants have indulged in the practice of serving imported trout to restaurant patrons and other consumers as Rocky Mountain trout, Rocky Mountain rainbow trout, or under other descriptive names which, to the consumer, indicate their domestic origin. If domestic trout producers are deprived of this market, it is feared that they may be unable to continue their other important function of supplying eggs and fingerlings for restocking our streams for the sportsman-angler.

Fraud and deception in the marketing or serving of food or any other product cannot, of course, be condoned. I am convinced, however, that to the extent that the provisions and sanctions of the bill properly involve Federal functions, they are unnecessary to prevent fraud and deception. The Tariff Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act already provide for necessary labeling of imported products. Furthermore, the provisions of S. 2033 are discriminatory and oppressive against foreign trade, and to a very substantial extent they would invade a field of regulation and enforcement which I believe should be left to the

States and localities. Finally, the costs of enforcement would be out of all proportion to funds available to the Food and Drug Administration for vital functions affecting the health of the American people.

Tariff Commission Report on Imports of Dried Figs

White House Office press release dated September 11

The President on September 11 approved a periodic report of the U. S. Tariff Commission in which the Commission stated that it does not appear that conditions have so changed as to warrant the institution of a new formal investigation on imports of dried figs.

On August 30, 1952, an increase in the tariff on imports of dried figs was established, and in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 10401 the Tariff Commission makes periodic reports to the President on subsequent developments in the dried figs trade. The September 11 report was the second made in this respect.

U.S. Army Engineers To Aid In St. Lawrence Seaway Construction

Designation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to acquire land, prepare plans, and otherwise aid in the construction of the U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway project was announced on September 2 by Lewis G. Castle, Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. The Corporation is subject to the direction and supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

In a letter to Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens requesting the services of the Corps of Engineers, Mr. Castle stressed the urgency of the project and said:

We regard it as essential that the highest priority be assigned to the maintenance of continuity of service during the engineering and construction period on the part of those individuals assigned by the Corps of Engineers to work on this project. Of equal importance is the high quality of workmanship that will be required.

You will appreciate the fact that involved in the undertaking of this Corporation are not only elements of national responsibility, but international as well, since the

project comprises a part of a joint Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway development with our great and friendly neighbor, Canada.

Mr. Castle outlined these services which the Corps of Engineers will perform: (a) land acquisition, (b) preparation of engineering plans and specifications, (c) making of recommendations and rendering assistance in awards to bidders, (d) other planning and engineering assistance as may be directed, and (e) such supervision of construction operations as may be, from time to time, delegated to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers by the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.

Eximbank Loan To Help Finance Water Project for Paraguay

The Export-Import Bank of Washington announced on September 8 that the bank has authorized a line of credit not to exceed \$7.2 million as may be required for the purpose of assisting the Republic of Paraguay in financing the U.S. equipment and services necessary for the installation of a central water-supply system in the city of Asunción.

The bank announcement said, in part:

This project will make a significant contribution to the improvement of the general health and welfare of a substantial segment of the Republic of Paraguay and will contribute to the further economic development of the country. The action of the bank reflects the continuing interest of the United States in the development of the South American Republics and confidence in their future.

Asunción, located on the Paraguay River, is a city of about 250,000 people. It is the capital and the cultural and business center of the country. Its port and power facilities also make it the hub of the country's industrial activity. Despite the rapid growth of the city, there is at present no public water-supply system and, consequently, no fire department. Water is obtained presently from privately owned wells and rainwater cisterns and by delivery from carts which retail water throughout the city. Contamination of wells is a serious problem. Although Paraguay has long desired to construct a central water works, it has not been able to meet the cost out of currently available revenues.

On the basis of preliminary engineering studies made several years ago by an American engineer-

ing firm, it is proposed that the water works will have a capacity of about 10 million gallons per day and initially will provide water service within the urban developed area of the city, comprising about 5 square miles. The Paraguayan Government intends to complete and bring up to date the earlier engineering studies and to formulate detailed plans and specifications for the execution of the project. Following the completion by the Government of satisfactory arrangements to insure the successful construction, administration, and maintenance of the proposed water-supply system, the precise terms and conditions of the credit will be determined.

The bank's credit is to be established not later than December 31, 1955, and will be made available to cover the cost of the necessary equipment, machinery, supplies, and services to be purchased in the United States. The expenditures required in Paraguayan currency, which are estimated at the equivalent of about \$2 million, will be financed by Paraguay from its own funds.

Thailand Joins FOA Investment Guaranty Program

The Foreign Operations Administration announced on September 10 that Americans interested in business ventures in Thailand may now apply for guaranties protecting their investments against losses from inconvertibility or expropriation. In an exchange of notes between the two Governments, the Government of Thailand has agreed to cooperate in the U.S. Government's guaranty investment program conducted through FOA.

Thailand thus became the twentieth foreign country to participate in the U.S. program which seeks to encourage new investments abroad by American private enterprise, investments which will help to build up the economic and defensive strength of free countries and support the further development of productive private enterprise. Other cooperating governments are Austria, Belgium, China (Formosa), Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Greece, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey (convertibility only), United Kingdom (convertibility only), and Yugoslavia.

The U.S. objective is to enlist for other free nations of the world not only American capital but also the technical and managerial skills and the progressive spirit of American private enterprise. Investments may be in cash, materials and equipment, patents, processes and techniques, or services. While they must be approved by the U.S. Government and the appropriate foreign government, there is no interference in the operation of the business.

U.S. Delegations to International Meetings

Consultative Committee of Colombo Plan

The Department of State announced on September 17 (press release 514) that the United States is participating in the Sixth Meeting of the Consultative Committee for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan") which will convene at Ottawa from September 20 to October 9, 1954. The Officials Meeting, convening September 20 through October 2, will be followed by a Ministerial Meeting from October 4 through October 9. The United States has been a member of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan since 1951.

Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will be the U. S. representative to the Ministerial Meeting. It is expected that Harold E. Stassen, Director, Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), accompanied by Norman Paul, Director, Office of Near East, South Asia and Africa Operations, FOA, will join the U.S. delegation for part of the Ministerial Meeting. It is hoped that Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State Designate, will also be able to be present.

Emerson A. Ross, Chief, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Department of State, will be the U.S. representative to the Officials Meeting and alternate U.S. representative to the Ministerial Meeting.

Other members of the delegation are Charles F. Baldwin, Economic Coordinator, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; John A. Loftus, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State; Peter H. Delaney, Deputy Officer in Charge of

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South Asian Economic Affairs, Department of State; Allan Loren, Chief, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand Division, and Solomon H. Chafkin, Deputy Chief, Philippines Division, Office of Far Eastern Operations, FOA; and Albert E. Pappano, First Secretary, American Embassy, Ottawa.

The Committee provides a forum in which countries cooperating in the economic development of the region of South and Southeast Asia meet on an annual basis to consult and advise on development problems of the area. The individual development programs of the area, generally covering the 6-year period July 1, 1951, through June 30, 1957, and setting forth the goals for achievement in specific fields of endeavor, are known collectively as "The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia."

The principal task of the Committee is to review development progress in the past year and examine the prospects for the next, or fourth year, of implementation of the Colombo Plan programs.

Countries represented on the Committee are Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and its territories in Malaya and British Borneo, the United States, and Viet-Nam. The Philippines and Thailand, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) generally send observers.

The last meeting of the Committee was held at New Delhi, India, September 28–October 17, 1953.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

International Children's Centre. Report on Activities in 1953. E/ICEF/264, June 1, 1954. 242 pp. mimeo. Voluntary Service for Reconstruction and Development. Statement submitted by the World Federation of United Nations Associations, a non-governmental organization in category A consultative status. E/C.2/392, June 14, 1954. 1 p. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Full Employment. Implementation of Full Employment and Balance of Payments Policies. Ethiopia. E/2408/Add.13, June 24, 1954. 6 pp. mimeo.

Full Employment. Implementation of Full Employment, Economic Development and Balance of Payments Policies. China-Taiwan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. E/2565/Add.4, June 18, 1954. 44 pp. mimeo.

The Question of Calling a United Nations Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2622, June 27, 1954. 6 pp. mimeo.

Full Employment. Implementation of Full Employment, Economic Development and Balance of Payments Policies. Finland, Laos. E/2565/Add.6, June 29, 1954. 28 pp. mimeo.

Election of One-third of the Membership of the Functional Commissions of the Council. Note by the Secretary-General. E/2630, July 3, 1954. 8 pp. mimeo.

General Progress Report of the Executive Director, United Nations Children's Fund. E/ICEF/267, July 15, 1954. 84 pp. mimeo.

Sixteenth Report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination to the Economic and Social Council. Annex—The Development of Co-ordination and Co-operation among the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in Economic and Social Programs. E/2607/Add.1, June 18, 1954. 46 pp. mimeo.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Canada Sign Great Lakes Fisheries Convention

Press release 501 dated September 10

Representatives of the United States and Canada on September 10 signed at Washington a convention on Great Lakes fisheries.

Acting Secretary Walter Bedell Smith and the Special Assistant for Fisheries to the Under Secretary, William C. Herrington, signed on behalf of the United States. The Canadian Ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, and the Canadian Deputy Minister of Fisheries, Stewart Bates, signed on behalf of Canada.

The convention provides for joint action by the United States and Canada in the field of fishery research and elimination of the predatory sea lamprey in the Great Lakes. To carry out this task, both Governments agree to establish a Great Lakes fishery commission of three appointees from each country.

The duties of the commission include the formulation of research programs regarding the

Great Lakes fisheries and the formulation and implementation of comprehensive programs for the destruction of the predatory sea lamprey which has been playing havoc with some of these fisheries, especially the white fish and lake trout fisheries. The commission may recommend to the Governments, on the basis of research findings, measures to make possible the maximum sustained yield of Great Lakes fisheries. The commission will have, however, no regulatory powers.

In the performance of its functions the commission will, wherever feasible, make use of the existing state, provincial and federal agencies in each country.

The convention, with an initial duration of 10 years, will become effective upon ratification by both countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, August 20, 1954.

Copyrights

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.¹

Ratification deposited: Haiti, September 1, 1954.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.²

Ratification deposited: Byelorussian S.S.R., August 11, 1954.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952.³

Accession deposited: India, August 3, 1954.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war. Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950.³

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian S.S.R., August 3, 1954; Hungary, August 3, 1954; the Netherlands, August 3, 1954; Ukrainian S.S.R., August 3, 1954; Ecuador, August 11, 1954.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement amending the agreement of November 19, 1953 (TIAS 3001), relating to off-shore procurement contracts. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Brussels May 13 and July 19, 1954. Entered into force July 19, 1954.

Canada

Convention on Great Lakes fisheries. Signed at Washington September 10, 1954. Enters into force on date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

Germany

Arrangement permitting units of the United States Air Force, temporarily stationed in the United Kingdom, to use the practice bombing range near Cuxhaven (Sandbank). Effectuated by exchange of notes at Bonn August 6 and 28, 1954. Entered into force August 28, 1954.

Greece

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation. Signed at Athens August 3, 1951.

Ratifications exchanged: September 13, 1954, at Athens. Enters into force October 13, 1954.

FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on September 15 made the following recess appointments:

Jack K. McFall to be Ambassador to Finland.
John E. Peurifoy to be Ambassador to Thailand.

Norman Armour to be Ambassador to Guatemala.

Edward T. Wailes to be Ambassador to the Union of South Africa.

Appointment

Raymond A. Hare as Director General of the Foreign Service (press release 508 dated September 13).

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 13-19**

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press release issued prior to September 13 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 501 of September 10.

No.	Date	Subject
507	9/13	Waugh: hearings on GATT.
508	9/13	Hare appointment.
509	9/15	Dulles: Manila Pact and Pacific Charter.
510	9/15	Dulles: departure for Europe.
†511	9/16	Foreign Relations volume.
*512	9/17	Phleger: international law.
513	9/17	Political advisers to G. A. Delegation (rewrite).
514	9/17	U. S. Delegation to Colombo Plan meeting.
515	9/18	Dulles: return from Europe.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Foreign Relations of the United States . . .
the basic source of information on U.S. diplomatic history

1937, Volume IV, The Far East

Documents published in this volume deal chiefly with problems arising from the outbreak of undeclared war between China and Japan in July 1937, especially with efforts by the United States and other powers to restore peace. This is the second of two volumes dealing with the Far East crisis in 1937, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume III, The Far East*, having been released in June.

In 1937 China faced Japan, with the Soviet Union watching from the sidelines and discussing developments with other powers. Nine hundred pages of contemporary papers deal with not only efforts to end the undeclared war but also other phases of the war itself and repercussions affecting the United States.

The principal chapter of this volume relates to a conference called at Brussels under the terms of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding China to explore the possibility of peaceful solution of the conflict between Japan and China. Chapters are also included on American relations with China, Japan, and Siam (Thailand).

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4 each.

Please send me copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937, Volume IV, The Far East*.

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